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Introduction*
This paper is about the question of Japanese national identity. Some might argue that the question
of national identity is obsolete in the face of the current forces of globalization, which, they believe,
have been rapidly transforming existing cultural differences into a single, global culture. Such a view
underestimates the deep-rootedness of the question. Given the present hegemonic processes in
international relations, the construction of national identity remains of central importance to any
conception of the current reconfiguration of the world order. The reason for this lies in the unique
historical origins and ontological status of both the space of international politics and that of the
modern nation-state. If we view the creation of international space as a ‘globalization’ of European,
linear, spatio-political design, then we can see that modern nation-states operate as bulwarks against
universalizing forces, ‘safe-guards’ of the cultural integrity particular to territorially based human
organizations united by common socio-linguistic discourse and historical experience. Indeed, no
human organization can survive without constructing a signifying boundary differentiating its
identity from others, its inside from its outside, and in the modern world, these two
phenomena—international space and the nation-state—are the inseparable twins of the hegemonic
system. To complicate the matter, however, cultural identity as such cannot be ` attained’ or ` lived’;
and yet at the same time, both the structural complementarity of `imagined communities’ and the
nature of the system of representation mediating the historical world and human cognition are
constantly manufacturing the necessity for the illusion of cultural identity.  At the intersection of
these multiple and problematic dimensions of national identity, prewar Japanese society became
increasingly preoccupied with the mission of `recovering’ its cultural identity, and in the process
generated something hitherto unseen: a Japanese world-view centered on a notion of the superiority
of traditional Japanese culture. As prewar history has demonstrated, such a preoccupation was a
narcissistic illusion and a campaign of violence against Asian `others’.
In this paper, I conceive identity as a particular cognitive inclination or a `movement’ of  a mind
troubled by its need—i.e., the desire for identity—characterized by a retrogressive longing for an
idealized past. Here I do not follow the conventional definition of national identity in the field of
international politics—the embodiment of the cultural characteristics common to a people.
Investigating the development of Japanese prewar discursive space between the rise of the romantic
movement circa 1905 and its maturity in the mid-1930s, I found Japanese intellectuals persistently
attempted to erase the existence and influences of the Other—the epistemological separation
between the subject and the object from which scientific objectivity and the modern conceptions
of humanity and history arises—by constantly challenging, denying and eventually dismissing such
philosophical traits from the native discursive space. This consistent effort to eliminate the Other
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matured in the mid-1930s, and the native discursive space came to demonstrate two highly
problematic and seemingly paradoxical characteristics: a hermeneutic `play of language’
characterized by an arbitrary linkage among signifiers devoid of meaning, and a `desire’ for
subjectivity and an articulation of meaning under the single banner of ` Japan’—the cultural essence
of the Japanese. Curiously, this development was accompanied by an extremely reductive
description of non-Japanese peoples (i.e., Chinese, Korean, and American), in such a way as to
affirm the superiority of Japanese culture. I argue that these features were the expression of  a
Japanese `collective effort’ to reconstruct a lost cultural identity, an attempt to construct an
imagined cultural ideal which had until then never existed. This was made possible only by denying
the past encounters with and the present existence of the Other and by radically diverging away
from the historical world, and as such constituted the discursive preconditions to a  fascist logic of
action and a mythological belief in the divinity of the emperor.
Seen in this light, then, a discussion of the question of Japanese national identity demands as much
attention as the relation between the historical world and the humanly constructed realm of
knowledge (discourse). Borrowing Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the Other and two modes of
cognition he distinguishes, I maintain that the socio-cultural conditions of Japan in the 1930s can
be described as cognition/discourse in the absence of the Other, wherein the cognitive frame
sustaining the structure of discourse as a whole is collapsed. In this structureless discursive space,
the world appears devoid of the critical distance between lived experiences and knowledge about
it, and ` identity’ between consciousness and its object (the body) could coincide. At the heart of the
Japanese discursive and social development that gradually slid into fascism lies, in my view, this
distortion of the cognitive/discursive structure, which authorized an attempted `reliving’ of a lost
cultural identity in the world of the `otherwise-Other’. As I hope to show in some detail in the
following discussion, this was not achieved without a series of ` intellectual violations’ and a massive
assault against the tenets of  rationality, objectivity, and history.
This paper is as much a product of my `awkward’ subject position—the fact that I am a Japanese
immigrant to Canada and working in English speaking discourse- as it is an intellectual exploration
of the subject matter. Due to this ` cross-boundariness’ of my subject position, I am endowed with
a `double-objective’ directed towards both Japanese and Canadian societies. For those Japanese-
born and educated, the critical analysis of Japanese fascism is inescapable—particularly given the
potential signs of danger in the current social and discursive state of the country—and it is my
presence and academic environment in Canada that allows me to take an ` outsider’s approach’. On
the other hand, it is equally inescapable that my position in Canadian society—as ` Japanese’, ` visible
minority’, and `immigrant’—furthers my commitment to the goal of fostering a better
understanding of the ontological burden carried by all `others’.
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The world at large is increasingly confined in a narcissistic enclosure in which each `community’ is
concerned with their own interests. The message this study hopes to send to the field of
international politics, and those seriously concerned about the future well-being of the world, is one
of the importance of understanding the mutual causes and structural dependence in the problematic
surrounding identity, and that the potential `solution’ of the problem of identity lies in the hands
of all participants of the international hegemony. For Canadians, in particular, as members of a
multi-cultural nation, the question of hegemonic representation and identity of the `other’ is an
inescapable issue, for Canada’s well-being is dependent on mutual understanding, respect, and
productive relations between the ` self’ and the ` other’. Once again, we need to confirm the presence
of the Other in our discursive space—as a reminder of the necessity for openness and meaningful
communication between different peoples—without which we jeopardize the survival of the
hegemonic system itself 
I.   Identity and the Other—Theoretical Underpinnings
When one extensively uses the term `discourse’ in certain fields of the social sciences, one cannot
escape at least a brief justification for the utility of the concept. An analysis with a predominant
focus on discourse is often criticized for its `neglect of the material world’, or its `failure to show
its relation to the material/structural aspects of history’. To be sure, one’s analysis must not be
ahistorical, nor divorced from the `material’; however, the lack of historicity and `materiality’ is a
problem indifferent of one’s focus on the discursive or otherwise. What lies beneath these criticisms
is an assumption that the world can be conceived as composed of two realms—the `material’ and
the `cognitive’. As David Campbell, drawing Richard Rorty’s insight, tacitly argues; 
...projects like philosophy’s traditional desire to see “how language relates to the world”
result in “the impossible attempt to step outside our skins—the traditions, linguistic and
other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with
something absolute.” 1
One must be aware that there is no single statement which can be free from a discursive context,
and the very categories we use, the problematic we identify, and the scope of our knowledge are
conditioned by both culture and history.
What I am arguing here is that discourse, or any other names given to a system of representation,
cannot be equated with the world; put differently, it could even be said that the (physical) world
exists outside of and perhaps independently of any discourse. Rather, discourse stands as an
inescapable medium between the self and the world. The world we can know is the one humanly
constructed; there is no world beyond and free of this mediation which we can conceive of.  In this
sense, discourse is not merely ` language’ reducible to a sum of all signifiers and signified, and neither
is it something that can control or change the objective world. As Foucault argues, 
...we must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must
not imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would only have
     4
to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no
prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour. 2
Moreover, since discourse is a humanly constructed space making the world appear in a particular
way, it imposes its own bias favouring some values by excluding others. This bias does not belong
to nor originate from the discourse itself; instead, it is a reflection of the very conditions which
constantly reshape itself, that is, socio-political power relations which themselves are external to the
discourse. Moreover, since discourse constitutes the cognitive framework in which one perceives,
understands and functions, the very modality of discourse can ` guide’ people to act in certain ways
which are often regarded as `natural’. Put differently, one can only conceive the world in relation
to what discourse informs. The question is then, what gives a discourse its structure, categories and
contents, what drives society in a particular direction, if the subject’s cognition is structured by the
discourse? There is no simple answer to this question. Perhaps we begin to answer it by looking at
the relation between the perceiving subject and the world as its object, the perceived.
How does the world become `perceivable’ and bearable for us to live in; what makes it appear as
if a structured whole, regulated by `laws’, and hence a manageable place for us? One explanation
is that given  by Kantian philosophy that the world we can and cannot perceive is regulated by the
very limitations of our cognitive and sensory equipment. In this explanation, the limitations of
human perception impose a structural grid, the structural order inherent in the human sensory
capacity itself, filtering the way the world can appear to us. The structuring order of the perceived
world, then, originates in the ` biologically’ given properties of the self/ego, who stands in the center
of the universe as a perceiving subject. The question of identity is formulated in this way as the
distance between the self as a perceiver and the world to be perceived. What if, however, this
cognizant subject itself is in some way conditioned by the world as perceived object, by the
precondition which allows the subject to take a subject position?  With our inadequate
understanding of the mechanism of cognition, we have no way of verifying this Kantian
explanation; neither can we rule out the possibility that something outside our frame of perception
is structuring our cognitive understanding.
Without entirely denying the Kantian argument, Gilles Deleuze introduces another way of
approaching the question.  He argues that “the mistake of theories of knowledge is that they
postulate the contemporaneity of subject and object”, and that in so doing, the temporal difference
inherent in the process of identification, as well as the spatial difference between the perceiving
subject and its object, is annihilated.3  Instead of conceiving the question as a problematic between
the perceiving subject and the perceived world, Deleuze locates the issue at stake in two different
modes of being of the subject as perceiver, that is, in a mode of cognition in the presence of the Other
and one in its absence. According to Deleuze, the presence of the Other allows the distinction
between one’s consciousness and its object, while its absence allows the two to be equated. Thus,
the question of identity should be seen in the shift of the subject’s orientation from one cognitive
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mode to another. In order to understand the question of identity and the problem surrounding it
in a Deleuzian sense, we have to begin with understanding of his key concept—the Other.
Deleuze himself seemingly has difficulty defining what is meant by the Other. He attempts to
provide several defining characteristics of the concept: “the Other is initially a structure of the
perceptual field, without which the entire field could not function as it does”4 ; “the Other, as
structure, is the expression of a possible world: it is the expressed, grasped as not yet existing outside of that
which expresses it”5 ; “In defining the Other...as the expression of a possible world, we make of it...
an a priori principle of the organization of every perceptual field in accordance with the categories;
we make of it the structure which allows this functioning as the `categorization’ of this field”6.  In
my interpretation, the Other is a historically determined a priori structure which shapes cognition by
drawing a boundary between what is conceivable and what is not, and by functioning as a mirror
to which relation the world can appear. In this sense, the Other is a constitutive outside of the discursive space
in which one is located, so that the realm inside its boundary becomes intelligible under a single
perspective, reason, and rationality. Therefore, the Other cannot be represented in any of the
available categories in the existing discourse, being literally beyond one’s cognition, while one’s
encounter with the Other provides a frame, or a structure, within which one’s cognition can operate.
The effect of the presence of the Other in the subject’s cognition is the assurance of the distinction
between consciousness and its object, reminding the subject of the temporal difference to which
the two belong. Deleuze describes;
...the Other causes my consciousness to tip necessarily into an `I was’, into a past
which no longer coincides with the object. Before the appearance of the Other, there
was, for example, a reassuring world from which my consciousness could not be
distinguished. The Other then makes its appearance, expressing the possibility of a
frightening world which cannot be developed without the one preceding it passing
away. For my part, I am nothing other than my past objects, and my self is made up
of a past world, the passing away of which was brought about precisely by the Other.
If the Other is a possible world, I am a past world... The Other thus assures the
distinction of consciousness and its object as a temporal distinction. 7  (p61-2) 
The encounter with the Other makes one aware of the state of the self and/or the meaning of the
world in their process of temporal passing, and thus, they become no longer identifiable with their
present state. What one has just come to be able to perceive has already become property of the
past, pushed temporarily behind by the encounter with the Other, opening up that which had been
previously inconceivable, the possible world in front of the subject. 
This argument is indicative of the difficulty involved in defining another key concept of this paper
—identity. The difficulty arises from an `elusiveness’ of the concept, as well as from the
misleadingly positive connotation associated with ethical imperatives (i.e., thou shalt...). According
to the above account, however, one can become conscious of one’s identity—the previous state of
being—only when it has just been lost. One is either in a state of, so-to-speak, ` unconsciously living
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one’s own identity’ in the absence of the Other, in which one is free from a consciousness of the
uneasy ` split between the mind and the body’, or one has become conscious of one’s identity in the
very experience of its loss in the presence of the Other.  In other words, identity is nothing like
`one’s defining characteristic’ or the `continuation of one’s root/origin’ as it is often described;
instead, consciousness of identity is a product of what is lost to presence, or more precisely, it is an
additional category to one’s cognitive map discovered by a retrospective movement of the conscious
mind which records the change that has occurred in the self. In this scheme, one’s ` cultural identity’
as such cannot be consciously lived/experienced, and preoccupation with the  `desire for identity’
signifies a romantic/emotional state of mind which refuses to face up to this moment of passing,
the encounter with the Other which had already happened.
The last point can be more clearly illustrated by noting what Deleuze says about the subject’s
cognitive orientation in the absence of the Other.
In the Other’s absence, consciousness and its objects are one. There is no longer any
possibility of error, not only because the Other is no longer there to be the tribunal
of all reality—to debate, falsify, or verify that which I think I see; but also because,
lacking in its structure, it allows consciousness to cling to, and to coincide with, the
object in an eternal present. [Quoting from Friday, Michel Tournier’s rewriting of
Robinson Crusoe] “And it is as though, in consequence, my days had rearranged
themselves. No longer do they jostle on each other’s heels. Each stands separate and
upright, proudly affirming its own worth. And since they are no longer to be
distinguished as the stages of a plan in process of execution, they so resemble each
other as to be superimposed in my memory, so that I seem to be ceaselessly reliving
the same day.” Consciousness ceases to be a light cast upon objects in order to
become a pure phosphorescence of things in themselves... 8 
In this mode of cognition, one fails to recognize that present consciousness can only see the object
(or the self) in the past, as `what it was’, and this failure makes the subject feel as if the present
subject and its object coincide in the present. The absence of the Other reduces all possible worlds
into a singularity, the only world is in the present. The world, therefore, appears as if a timeless,
unchanging continuation of what is at any given moment of perception. Since there is no
temporality involved in this scheme of thought, the thing perceived by the subject is fixed into an
eternal essence of matter, and the world appears as the assemblage of pure surface with neither a
structure nor a  frame to hold the epi-phenomenal pieces in order. In this cognitive realm, the world
of subjective consciousness is united with its ` object’ [though such ` object’ should perhaps be called
`things’ to distinguish between the differing construals of the world under the two modes of
cognition], there is no place for objective judgment to intervene, and moreover, where there is no
objective judgment, there are no ethics. 
The advent of modern subjectivity in prewar Japanese society can be seen as the result of unwanted
influences which brought about an objectification of the self, or an externalization of the subject,
that is, a view of the self as an object from outside. This duality was accompanied by a sense of loss
or a depletion of identity; Japanese people of the Meiji era became aware of their previous state of
     7
contented innocence, free from the shrewd, analytical eyes of a modern consciousness which
alienated the body as object, as a lost state. This encounter of the Japanese with the modern West
and the philosophical properties thrust the Japanese `temporarily forward’, making them different
from what they were, opening their eyes to a possible identity until that time unthought. Employing
the Deleuzian paradigm, we may describe this shift in their cognition as one from in the absence
of the Other to its presence. The reverse movement, from the presence of the Other to its absence,
what Deleuze calls `destructuration’, and what might be described as a romantic/emotional static
state of mind, involves an active negation of the world just opened up, driven by the desire to
reconstitute what has been made into the ` irrecoverable past’ in the encounter with the Other. This
desire to deny the encounter with the Other and its fall out, may be used to characterize prewar
Japanese discursive development in the period from the rise of romanticism around 1905 to the
finale of WWII. Might we see the cognitive orientation of Japanese discourse in the 1930s as an
attempt to erase the possibilities of the Other (and the impact of the modern West), carried out in
the hope of reconstituting the `world-as-it-used-to-be’, and of `reliving’ the past? In such an
attempt, both temporality and socio-historical processes collapse, and the essence of a lost ideal is
equated with present life experience as the presence of things-in-themselves. 
What happens when one slides into this problematic cognitive mode, in the absence of the Other,
is a breakdown of the structure which conditions the field of cognition, a structure organized and
sustained in the presence of the Other. Since the Other is the constitutive outside on which all
knowledge depends, the outside limit beyond which one’s knowledge of the world cannot reach,
the elimination of the Other results not in a realization of one’s dreamed for world in history, but
in a radical deviation from the world as historically viewed. In Deleuze’s words, those who eliminate
the Other from their cognition,
... liberate an image without resemblance [to the `real’ world], or their own double
which is normally repressed. This double in turn liberates pure elements which are
ordinarily held prisoner. The world is not disturbed by the absence of the Other; on
the contrary, it is the glorious double of the world which is found to be hidden by
its presence. This is Robinson’s discovery: the discovery of the surface, of the
elemental beyond, of the `otherwise-Other’. 9
In this phenomenal/ahistorical world in which consciousness and its `objects’ (i.e., `things’) are
united, the satisfaction of one’s desire becomes absolute and a matter of necessity. To speak a subject’s
desire is a misconstrual, for the very ground which gives rise to subjects and objects has collapsed,
and there is no longer a subject as such: “desire is not then internal to a subject, any more than it
tends toward an object: it is strictly immanent to a plan which it does not preexist, a plan which it
must construct.”10   When seen from the level of the collective, society as a whole can fall into a state
of operating in an illusory world, in which the entire discursive space becomes one that informs
nothing but the world of necessity, ceaselessly motivating the ` subjectless-subject’ to fulfill a ` plan’
of desire.  In this scenario, the entire cognitive system loses its structure, its limit boundary, and the
possible world as the structure-Other is effaced, leaving the subject prisoner of the present, and of
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the obsessive world of the pure surface and elements.  Moreover, as Deleuze has stated, there is
even “no longer any possibility of error”, “consciousness [is allowed] to cling to, and to coincide
with, the object in an eternal present” and each thing-in-itself  “proudly affirm[s] its own worth”.11
As I argue in the following sections, this schema gives us a potent image of  the state of Japanese
discursive space in the 1930s. What Deleuze calls Robinson’s “discovery of the surface,” “the
elemental beyond,” and “the `otherwise-Other’”, in so far as the intellectual production of the age
suggests, was shared by many Japanese. 
Moreover, if this spread of pure surface epi-phenomena in the discursive space can be seen as a
manifestation of cognition in the absence of the Other, which resulted from a romantic/aesthetic
cognitive disposition, then, might we characterize prewar Japanese discursive space as
simultaneously laden with the desire to regain a perceived lost identity, a desire manifest in the
attempt to construct ideal images of the past wherein one could supposedly live an identity of
timeless cultural essence?  A further question of great importance is: Does this cognitive state
provide a fertile seed bed for fascism, which Emile Nolte has described as `a refusal of
transcendence’, a nurturing ground for corporealist politics—the soil in which action is favoured
over discussion, and blood and will over thought and reason. It is my hypothesis that deep down
in the socio-political phenomenon referred to as fascism lies a problem of cognition, that is, the loss
of the structure that orders cognition and discourse as a whole caused by a breakdown in the system
of discursive mediation between human cognition and the physical world in which the latter is
adequately mirrored in the former. In the case of prewar Japanese society, this problematic mode
of cognition was accompanied by and accelerated in conjunction with the rise of the desire for
cultural identity, itself a product of the particular historical context of international space in which
the modern hegemonic world was in the process of formation.  
The above socio-cultural and psychological analysis of the experience of the Japanese people,
therefore, must be located in the much larger process of the formation of modern hegemonic
discourse, from which representation the Japanese were excluded and/or ` mis-represented’ as lesser
Westerners. The central issues here are the questions of the `self’ and the `other’ and that of the
question of identity of those who are denied full representation. All knowledge is constantly drawing
and redrawing the boundary between what is to be included in and what excluded from its domain,
defining and distinguishing `inside from `outside’, `self’ from `other’ and `representable’ from
`unrepresentable’. A `strategic exclusion’, or the exclusion of the `constitutive outside’ allows an
enclosed realm of intelligibility to be established. To what extent did the modern world emerge as
a single intelligible space under Western eyes, and transforming the different cultures and peoples
of the non-West from a state of being external to the West to one of being internal, intelligible,
lesser than the ` self’—i.e., the ` others’? To the same extent, then, this establishment of an enclosed
discursive space—the modern world—invited resistance in the very exclusion of those who were
deprived of identity. This resistance could be pursued either by means of negotiating boundaries
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defining the `self’ and the `other’, or challenging the authority of the modern world view by
constructing an all together alternative realm of intelligibility. The latter option was attempted by
the prewar Japanese society which sought to construct an anti-modern, anti-Western nativist
discursive space, one operating within a  `Japanese perspective’ proudly representing the Japanese
as the `self’, at the expense of generating its own `others’.
The problematic development in prewar Japanese discursive space, by attempting to erect an
alternative constitution with its own boundaries and exclusions, could then also be seen as a nativist
challenge to the authority of Euro-centric international hegemonic discourse. In this pursuit, both
insiders (nativist) and outsiders (Others) fell subject to its local hegemonic construction: inside
because equated with the homogenization of the essence of Japanese tradition, and outside the
realm of the Others excluded from representation by their conversion into lesser ` others’, the falsely
represented externality. In its impossible desire of representing what was already made
unrepresentable, however, this challenge to the international hegemonic discourse was inherently
contradictory and self-destructive. Despite its motivation to be free from the influence of Euro-
centric universal hegemonic discourse, this nativist discourse actually functioned within the
modern/Western international hegemony in such a way as to reinforce the latter’s central authority
and the former’s very dependence on it. At the core of this desperate and destructive attempt, often
described as ultra-nationalism and/or fascism, lies the issue yet to be resolved, that is, the identity
of the Others, those who were deprived of identity and the voices for representing themselves in
international hegemonic discourse, which is perhaps shared by all peoples from non-Western parts
of the world. Indeed, the study of prewar Japanese discursive space clearly demonstrates a Japanese
preoccupation with the consciousness of its cultural difference from the West and a desperate
attempt to eliminate all influences from, or even the fact of an encounter with, the Other.
In the following sections of this paper, I investigate Japanese prewar discursive space seeking to
demonstrate the characteristics I have described as a shift in the mode of cognition from that in the
presence to that in the absence of the Other. I argue that prewar intellectual productions were
driven by non-rational, extra-discursive inclinations, namely a desire to recover a perceived lost
identity. Such extra-discursive forces sought to eliminate some key aspects of rational knowledge,
such as modern subjectivity, the historical and the political, and `objectivity’, that is, the degree of
`accuracy’ in representing the historical world. The process of elimination of the Other also led to
two highly problematic features of prewar Japanese discursive space—the ` play of language’ devoid
of meaning and the reclamation of a `lost subjectivity’. That this problematic tendency developed
in Japanese discursive space reflects an historical legacy of the way Japan as a non-Western country
encountered the modern West in relation to which Japan’s national identity was formulated. I
therefore argue that the problematic development in the Japanese discursive space must be located
in the particular international context of the time, namely the expansion of the modern world. In
the following section, I study the development of the Japanese discursive space up to and including
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the 1930s, hoping to show specific tactical and academic `violations’ committed by influential
prewar scholars in the service of the elimination of the Other. I pay particular attention to Watsuji
Tetsuro’s work on ethics and cultural studies which I think best demonstrates the problematic
features of cognition in the absence of the Other. The section following attempts to address the
meaning and significance of such developments in a greater historical context.
Before beginning, however, I should clarify my use of the key term, the Other. I am using the term
in two distinctive senses, following Deleuze: first the Other as the structure which “conditions the
functioning of the entire perceptual field [or discursive space] in general” 12, and second, the Other
as “the concrete Other” actualizing the structure in specific actor(s)/situation(s). For example, the
Other as structure was met by Japanese society in the 19th century in the form of the modern West,
whereas the concrete/actual/representative Other could be the West, the U.S., China, or Korea. In
addition, I make a distinction between the Other[s] (capital O) and the `other’[s] (small o) in order
to clarify different relations to the discursive space in question; that is, the former designates
externality, what remains outside the system of cognition and/or representation, whereas the latter
designates a falsely internalized version of externality, a violent reduction and `mis-representation’ of .the
incomprehensible.  For example, the West and China, those who cannot be fully defined nor
represented in Japanese discourse— are Others to the Japanese, whereas the treatment of the West
and China by Japanese discourse in the 1930s constitutes their reduction, into a crude stereotype
as `others’.  The term `discursive space’ is employed to mean the entire sphere of knowledge to
which one has access, in order to make a clearer distinction from the term `discourse’, which may
be confined to a particular field of knowledge.
 II.   Prewar Japanese Discursive Developments—A Study
Kokutai no Hongi—Ideological Finale
In 1937, the year of the Japanese military assault on mainland China, the Ministry of Education
published Fundamentals of Our National Polity (Kokutai no Hongi), a spiritual guidebook preparing the
Japanese people for the coming of a ` total war’. Despite its clear exhortation for self-sacrifice from
the people, the booklet was accepted with a surprising (and disturbing) popularity; final sales were
in the neighborhood of 2,000,000, immensely outnumbering the initial printing of 300,000 copies.13
It opens with a condemnation of Enlightenment values, which are identified as causes of  the
“ideological and social evils of present-day Japan”, and ends with a proclamation of Japan’s
“mission” in world civilization: that of providing a synthesis between Eastern and Western
philosophy. 
The various ideological and social evils of present-day Japan are the result of
ignoring the fundamental and running after the trivial, of lack of judgment, and a
failure to digest things thoroughly; and this is due to the fact that since the days of
Meiji so many aspects of European and American culture, systems, and learning,
have been imported, and that, too rapidly. As a matter of fact, the foreign ideologies
imported into our country are in the main ideologies of the Enlightenment that have
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come down from the eighteenth century, or extensions of them. The view of the
world and of life that form the basis of these ideologies are a rationalism and a
positivism, lacking in historical views, which on the one hand lay the highest value
on, and assert the liberty and equality of, individuals, and on the other hand lay value
on a world by nature abstract, transcending nations and races. Consequently,
importance is laid upon human beings and their groupings, who have become
isolated from historical entities, abstract and independent of each other. It is
political, social, moral, and pedagogical theories based on such views of the world
and of life, that have on the one hand made contributions to the various reforms
seen in our country, and on the other have had deep and wide influence on our
nation’s primary ideology and cult... 14
Our present mission as a people is to build up a new Japanese culture by adopting and sublimating
Western cultures with our national polity as the basis, and to contribute spontaneously to the
advancement of world culture. Our nation early saw the introduction of Chinese and Indian
cultures, and even succeeded in evolving original creations and developments. This was made
possible, indeed, by the profound and boundless nature of our national polity; so that the mission of the people
to whom it is bequeathed is truly great in its historical significance.15
What is referred as `our national polity’, more popularly known as kokutai, is the equation of the
nation with its people on the principle of the imperial descent of all Japanese, in which the entire
population was conceived as members of a family extended from ancient times. The text attempts
to evoke one’s sense of responsibility to the family, to the local representatives of each agrarian
community, and to the emperor at the top of hierarchy merging the ethical and ideological
structures. Noteworthy is the text’s theoretical leap from the criticism of modernity as Western in
the opening passage to Japan’s cultural `mission’ in the world in its conclusion, without any
reasonable explanation or logically coherent justification. The criticism of Western philosophy
bluntly sketched in the introduction is not analyzed in the rest of the work; instead, it appears that
each reader’s imagination, after reading the aesthetically presented virtues of the Japanese character
in the middle part of the booklet, is expected to fill in the missing chains of rational explanation.
Presumably, each reader would be/was convinced of the necessity of the ` civilizing’ mission the text
advocates in its conclusion. For such a work to obtain its overwhelming popularity and influence,
however, a particular modality of discursive space capable of filling the gap of logic and the absence
of explanation must have already been in place. Or, restating this, throwing in emotionally appealing
phrases and slogans was thought to be `content’ sufficient to motivate the masses for action. This
power of prewar Japanese discourse falsely reasoned was a product of a gradual ` singularization’ of
the discursive space in which all debates were folded into the particular mode of discourse and
arguments counter to the dominant ideas were understood in the very mode one intended to
challenge. 
Certain features of Fundamentals of Our National Polity (Kokutai no Hongi) demonstrate some of  the “evils”
of prewar Japan, although neither in the way the text intended nor for the reasons it suggests (i.e.,
the obsolescence of modern values). What the text demonstrates is the particular inclination
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inherent in prewar Japanese discursive space towards the elimination of the historical, the political,
the material, and modern subjectivity from discussion. These elisions are what were perceived as
the salient features of the modern West, which had introduced into Japan social division, conflicts,
and a breakdown in the moral unity of the nation, experienced as the loss of a sense of identity. The
dominance of this exclusively cultural spiritual and aesthetic perspective, in which the problematics
and resolutions of the critical historical period were sought, resulted in a blindness to the crude
reality of Japanese imperialism intensified by the military advance to China. Prewar discourse
functioned as an interpretive screening system showing how one should perceive and understand the
world, a system of interpretation constructed by and for the enclosed community, indifferent to the
degree of divergence from `objective’ events and the perspective of Others. 
The Rise of `Romantic’ Social Sciences—Folk Ethnology and Nohonshugi
The `romantic’ tendency to devaluate the intellect, the objective, the modern subject and the
historical was neither an isolated event in any one particular scholar nor specific fields of knowledge,
but affected the entire discursive sphere. Hasumi Shigehiko, a Japanese contemporary theorist,
locates the advent of this romantic inclination by early Taisho era (1912-1925) in the field of
literature. Hasumi characterizes this movement from shajitsu-shugi to shizen-shugi as the death of literary
realism, or realist materialism, wherein shajitsu-shugi typifies observation with the `analytical eyes of
the intellect’, while the latter, that of observation with ` spiritual eyes’ in which intellect and emotion
are supposedly synthesized. 16 By analyzing debates on shizen-shugi, Hasumi finds that the rise of this
ambiguous literary category itself works as a system to nullify meaningful debate governed by some
level of objectivity based on reason. 17 This romantic, anti-objectivist stance of literary and scholarly
work is, according to Hasumi, a result of a reduction of the opposition between the subject and the
object into that between ` life’ and ` material’ in favour for the former, a reduction in which logic fails
to understand the meaning of `life’ as fundamentally beyond the subject/object duality.18  In this,
the emphasis lies on the assumption of the superiority of the categories of ` emotion’, ` subjectivity’,
`collectivity’, and `spatiality’ over their counter-parts, `reason’, `objectivity’, `individuality’ and
`temporality’. One of the effects of the rise of shizen-shugi and the abandonment of  reason in favour
of spirituality was a widespread cynical mood, contemptuous of the `objective’/`scientific’ and
`material’ aspects of knowledge as inferior; or rather vise-versa, that is, the very rise of this anti-
rationalism allowed shizen-shugi to prevail.
The social sciences were equally, if not more dramatically, affected by this rise of anti-
rational/modern romanticism. Yanagida Kunio, in one of his major works Tono Monogatari (The tale
of Tono), established the discipline of Japanese ethnology by studying the lifestyle of rural agrarian
villages and organizing local folk myths into a modern form of knowledge known as minzoku-gaku.
Disaffected by the intrusion of modern/Western influences, particularly prevalent in the urban
sector, Yanagida, a disaffected urbanite, devoted his energies to preserving what he believed was
a disappearing Japanese `tradition’ that remained only in the countryside. This aesthetic
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representation of the countryside was later adapted by a group of reactionary and revolutionary
social scientists who advocated the transformation of the Japanese socio-political order into one
centered on agriculture and traditional cultural values—the advocates of nohonshugi (agriculture-ists).
Yanagida and the nohonshugi intellectuals depicted rural agrarian life in an idealized form using a
language in which the distance between this-worldly processes of agrarian labour and the
mythological realm of deity practice is transcended. In so doing, they not only succeeded in evoking
strongly idealized images of a ` traditional Japan’ in their readers, but also motivated the rural people
to realize this idealized tradition. 
The disciplines of folk ethnology and nohonshugi were heavily dependent on popular folk beliefs, in
which the process of agricultural production was interpreted as the fulfillment of human duty to the
gods in an elaborate system of symbolic meanings. In these folk beliefs, the labour of food
production and sexual relations between men and women were valued as acts of prosperity,
ensuring physical well-being and the reproduction of human life.19  In this narrative, the sacred
origin of mankind created a linkage between the cosmic order and one's bodily substance considered
as a gift from the gods, tacitly assuring the maintenance and propagation of the ancestral lineage as
obligatory deity duties.20  Moreover, agrarian villages, as the sites where deity duties were fulfilled,
were also suffused with important values and rich meanings. Since sacred cultivation was practiced
on lands inherited from one's ancestors, those who shared the same lands were regarded as
`brothers' and villages were considered to be a single extended family. This filiality was evoked by
images of shared bodily substance, and the mutual ancestral soil figuratively referred to as the
material of the human body.21  For example, the word ` tami’ (people) composed of the two Chinese
characters ` ta’, meaning rice field, and ` mi’, the body, was thought to literally signify both ` the body
in the field’ and ‘the field as the body’.22
Between the late 1920s and the mid-1930, folk ethnology and nohonshugi were successfully grafted
upon these popular mythological beliefs. The effect of this modernization of everyday knowledge
was that villagers became conscious of their status in folk ethnologic and nohonshugi discourses as
objects. Conscious of such status, villagers began to make reference those discourses in their daily
deliberations and practices; and by doing so they began to realize the anti-modern agrarian
communalism advocated by the nohonshugi-ists. After the Russo-Japanese war (1905), intensified
modernization began to cultivate the ground for the later popular acceptance of these doctrines.
Soaring taxes, the stagnation of agricultural prices, and the influx of modern goods and ideas from
the metropole combined with a growing emigration to the cities, led to the breakdown of the socio-
communal fabric, particularly amongst the young.23  The introduction of Marxism in previous
decades, the principal means by which Western concepts of subjectivity and historical progress took
root in the rural villages, led in the late 1910s the first collective negotiation between landlords and
agrarian tenants.  The ensuing radical social differentiation and internal divisions were the face of
the Other that villagers encountered, appearing to many as ` chaotic’, ` uncertain’, and ` conflictious’
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vis-à-vis previously ` calm’, ` predictable’, and ` harmonious’ village life.  By the late 1920s, however,
these divisions were united under the banner of ` revitalizing the villages’, turning the current of the
times from division to unity, conflict to harmony, and from progressive politics to aesthetic
harmony.
One of concrete results of this motivation towards the realization of an ideal vision of communal
village life was the collapse from late 1920s onwards of the Marxist agrarian movement (the first
collectively organized political movement of tenant agrarians), whose leaders often converted into
nohonshugi advocates. Kobayashi Norito, a leading activist in the Nagano division, argued for a ` return
to concrete places'— i.e. the family and the village—in which one should actively strive for their co-
prosperity, rather than creating internal divisions.24  `Converts’ like Kobayashi evinced a discovery
of `everyday life’ and village `reality’ accompanied by a recognition of the unsustainability of the
Western concept of social struggle to Japanese communal `reality’.25  Wago Tsuneo, another
`convert’, called for rural submission to the supremacy of the collective good, and denounced the
freedom of the self in favour of the communal whole.26  Underlying the radical shift in Wago’s
position was a spiritual yearning for the `totality of life’ and a `unity with the universe’ which, he
felt, could purify the triviality of human conflicts and replace the hollowness of ideals with religious
salvation.27  As a result, Wago increasingly departed from his prior concern with worldly problems
and removed himself into a religious world of ideals. The fundamental difficulties these leaders
faced, ones which were perhaps shared by many others of the time, were those of  justifying their
cause in a discursive environment increasingly singularized and moralized under the growing
authority of the sign of `Japan’ and its `tradition’, an authority essentially incompatible with a
progressive organized agrarian movement operating via internal divisions and conflicts. 
The fundamental influential power of nohonshugi, like the old mythology,  was its capacity to construct
a ` coherent', ` total' and imaginary world view, in which the boundaries between the present and the
past, humans and gods, and culture and nature were blurred. However, this concatenation of the
historical with the eternal in nohonshugi was not the ‘innocent’ practice of prior times, but rather the
historical construct of folk ethnology and nohonshugi in which the subjects of the discourse (agrarian
villagers) were at the same time textual objects, and as such the door was opened to political
manipulation.  By virtue of one's daily participation in agricultural labour and obligation to the
deities, farmers translated the distant age of the gods into the `reality' of the present, and thereby
made incarnate the living form of the divine cosmos. This timeless world of gods and humans
allowed one to envisage culture and the humanly constructed social order as part of a natural-
organic entity; the parts (the individual villagers) were conceived as constitutive segments of the
whole (the village as an image of the national and cosmic family). In this conception of the folk,
culture and society were absorbed into a `natural’ order, thereby nullifying the impact of newly
introduced Western concepts of history and social struggle. As a result, the folk were removed from
the sphere of social differentiations resulting from production, and social hierarchy and inequality
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among classes was rationalized as a `natural’ given—translated into the totality of `naturalized’
culture.28  The devaluation of history in turn enabled an elevation of the values of the countryside,
ancestral lands, and agricultural field and soil. By transforming the social and the political into the
cultural, and the cultural into the `natural’, living in the world became a simple, depoliticized and
dehistoricized, reproduction of timeless essences. In short, while folk ethnology effectively captured
its audience by describing the rural folk in aesthetic terms, nohonshugi motivated villagers to take part
in its project of constructing an idealized socio-political order centering on village harmony. 
The irony of folk knowledge and nohonshugi was that they ended up being servants of  conservative
forces and the state, despite their initial promise of saving the rural poor from institutional and
economic powers. By creating a type of knowledge which elided the distinction between what
belonged to the realm of discourse and what discourse referred to—i.e., the lives of the rural folk
-, the rural poor were transformed into both the objects of knowledge and the agents for carrying
out the project of realizing an idealized image of the countryside as the embodiment of Japanese
cultural tradition. What was introduced by the Other—i.e., the modern conceptions of a subject
who attempted to take control over his/her fate and that of history as continuous social struggle—
were replaced by a vision of harmonious rural collective life devoid of conflicts and internal
differences. In the experience of the countryside, therefore, the elimination of the Other was
achieved by a successful articulation of the pre-existing cosmology and agrarian myths into a
modern romantic and revolutionary knowledge in which rural folk were tacitly subjugated to the
hierarchical social power of the discourse of the state, giving rise to the constitutive unit—the
modern `folk’ village—of the socio-political system of kokutai.
The Hermaneutics of Surface—The Discourse of `Japan’ in the Mid-1930s
The mid-1930s is known in Japan as the era of the `recovery of literary art’ (bungei fukkoh) by which
is meant the liberation of literature from `politics’. It may also be seen as a breakdown of leftist
`politics’ (such as labour movement, communism, and agrarian tenant movement) from 1933 and
the rising dominance of fascist ` politics’ (the beginning of Japan’s military invasion to China) from
1937.29  Karatani Kojin, a contemporary Japanese philosopher and literary critic, argues that this
short time period saw a `literalization (or `humanization’) of philosophy’, that is, a merge between
literary criticism and what appears to be philosophy in favour for the former.30 The most influential
prewar scholars of the social sciences and humanities, including Nishida Kitaro (philosophy) and
Watsuji Tetsuro (ethics), whose major works were published in this period, attempted to incorporate
existential aspects into a ` crude formal scientism’.31  These works, which largely spoke to the urban
literate classes were undeniably reactionary in their import, in their attempt to eliminate all the
objective scientific categories and materialist aspects of Marxism, in favour of what were called the
`human’ scientific categories and existential aspects of Marxism mixed with aesthetic and religious
language. 32 
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Watsuji Tetsuro, one of the most influential and respected prewar Japanese thinkers, is extremely
important in an analysis of how prewar Japanese discursive space advanced towards its complete
elimination of the Other. A careful examination of his major works deserves particular attention,
in terms of the method and language used, the themes described, and the `enemies’ targeted. An
analysis of Watsuji’s work not only informs us of the various flaws in his logic, but also allows us
to see the particular ` motivation’ running through his texts which seems to make all his theoretical
problems and inclinations inevitable and even necessary. How and why these highly problematic
works became so influential in the discursive space of the era is a question that must be addressed?
Watsuji was highly critical of the positivistic separation of the subject and the object (and of man
from nature) in modern/Western scientific knowledge. In one of his representative work, Fudo:
ningengaku-teki kosatsu (Fudo, a humanistic study; 1935), Watsuji rejects the conception of an autonomous
subject thrown into the objective environment, and advances in its stead the concept of  fudo
(`climatological features’) as “a structural constituent of human existence”33 ; that is,  fudo is the
geographical space in which collective human life is organized and practiced. Watsuji was inspired
by Heidegger’s Being and Time, with which he was both fascinated and frustrated; Wastuji’s ambition
was to incorporate spatial constituents of human existence into Heideggar’s conception of human
temporal existence.34  According to Watsuji, the predominance of temporality over spatiality in
Heidegger’s thought arises because of his bias for the individual subject (and his being as Dasein) and
his lack of conception of human existence as both individual and social. However, Watsuji’s interest
in spatiality over temporality is a curious one, particularly when one notes that spatiality was easily
linked to Japan’s sense of isolation and uniqueness, whereas a focus on temporality is likely to
suggest Japan’s backwardness in modern history. Based on his emphasis of the collective and
corporeal existence of mankind, Watsuji attempts to deal with the remaining question of spatiality,
or  fudo, not as a mere extension of physical/mathematical space objectified vis-à-vis mankind, as
modern Western philosophy tends to see it, but in the context of the temporality and historicity of
human existence.35
However, this incorporation of subjectivity to what is objectified and Watsuji’s theoretical
conception of spatiality as the embodiment of  human collectivity was made possible only at the
expense of  nullifying the modern conception of the individual, autonomous subject. This trade-off
can be seen, for example, in the following passage; 
A man lives and dies. Despite the continuous process of the death of the individual,
mankind lives and human relations continue. Human existence unceasingly
continues by unceasingly ending. The `existence towards death’ in the perspective
of the individual is the `existence towards life’ in the perspective of the social....
History obtains so-to-speak corporeal body in the unity of historicity and fudo [as
humanly inhabited space]. If `spirit’ is defined in opposition to materiality, history
cannot be a self-realization of spirit. Only when spirit is a subject which objectifies
itself, does it realizes itself as history. This, what might be called subjective corporeality, is
what I mean as fudo-ness. 36
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The price for this corporeal conception of fudo was the absorption of the materiality of history into
spirit, resulting in a nullification of the dialectical tension between the two mutually irreducible
components of existence, and simultaneously confirms the predominance of the social whole over
the individual part.  Watsuji’s nullification of historical process and downplaying modern subjectivity
here became much more manifest in Watsuji’s collective ethics, his `social scientific’ studies of the
mid-1930s.
In his Ningen no gaku toshiteno rinri-gaku (Ethics as the Study of Humanity; 1934) and Rinri-gaku (Ethics; 1937, vol.1),
Watsuji criticizes that he sees as the sheer `objectivism’ and atomistic conception of the subject in
both  Marxist materialism and liberal institutionalism, and attempts to `humanize’ the analysis of
socio-cultural problems by `overcoming’ the problem of the subject/object duality via a notion of
mankind as a collective being. Watsuji explains that the Japanese word ningen (mankind), should not
be reduced to mean `person’/`man’ as it is often used in modern commonsense, but has to be
understand as a being within the sphere of human relations, and indeed as the manifestation of such
collectivity, as is indicated by the two Chinese characters constituting the term (the first of which
signifies `person’ and the second `between’).37  Further, Watsuji defines rinri (ethics) as already and
always embodied in social relations: “rinri wa jinrin no ri”, that is, ethics (`rinri’) is the logic (`ri’) of the
moral ways of mankind (`jinrin’).38  For Watsuji, Jinrin is defined as the interactive relations normally
held in the socio-cultural arena of  the Japanese people. In other words, Watsuji boldly equates
ethics with the status-quo of society, without any social scientific investigation of the society.
Moreover, due to his assumption that ethical relations between individuals is embodied in and
maintained by collective Japanese social existence, Watsuji is entirely indifferent to the necessity of
formulating beyond contingency universal and/or objective standards for ethics. By equating
semantic signification and social reality in a contingent schema, Watsuji’s theory of ethics functions
as a mechanism masking social injustice under an idealized vision of the socio-cultural virtue of the
Japanese, and clearly props up the de facto power of those who exercised power.
Tosaka Jun, a prewar Marxist literary critic, argues that Watsuji’s theory operates with an implicit
but firm assumption of Japanese superiority relative to others and is a powerful ideological
instrument confirming the uniqueness of Japanese culture and society. According to Tosaka,
Watsuji’s terminologies of  ningen (mankind), rinri (ethics), and sonzai (being) are the central
constituents of that on which his theory depends, and as such does little to account for why and
how the communal socio-cultural system came into being .39   Tosaka argues that Watsuji does not
analyze his subject matter in any objective way; instead, he constructs a narrative that
impressionistically evokes the idea that communally-based Japanese society is precious, and
something to be proud of as a superior form of ethics in the world.40  This academic sleight of hand,
however, is tacitly concealed by the narrative structure of Watsuji’s text in which only one of two
possible functions of the Japanese copula is used. That is, Watsuji reduces the particularity of a thing
to its phenomenological manifestation.  In Japanese, ` facts’ or ` things-in-themselves’ are indicated
     18
by the copula, `ga aru’, that which recognizes a distance between the subject and the object and
signifies the existence of the object without reference to the subject, while the copula ‘de aru’
describes an event interpreted by the subject.41  Noteworthy here is that the copula ` de aru’ lends itself
to a moral imperatives, and that Watsuji’s discourse, in subordinating grammar to narrative—its
preference of ‘de aru’ over ‘ga aru’—advances a ‘description’ of socio-cultural practice as a quasi-
Hegelian unfolding of a pre-existing truth which is in fact a value judgment. When Watsuji proudly
represents Japanese social relations as the embodiment of collective ethics, he elides the distinction
between is and ought, and thus his exhortation to his readers to fulfill their duty of performing their
`proper’ roles in society is only possible by glossing over this elision and representing his discourse
as descriptive fact. 
As is often pointed out, hermeneutic study is valid only insofar as it recognizes its limited scope and
applicability in the analysis of socio-linguistic regularity in the realm of the symbolic, and only
insofar as it assumes an artificially enclosed, homogenized socio-cultural space free from
external/international influences. This is not the case with Watsuji’s hermeneutics. Instead, the
subject of his text is objectified as a discursive constituent. That is, the people are seen as both
cultural symbols and the source of meaning on the one hand, while his methodology sanction his
conclusion from any material, historical, or political inquiry, such as a study of structural power
relations among different social segments, on the other. His hermeneutic method allows for an
elimination of material aspects, which are then thrown behind his phenomenology, and terminology
conveniently omitting socio-historical human conditions in which the subject is subordinated to
`objective’ power.42  Thus, not only is the particularity of the individual absorbed into the harmony
of the social whole, as can be seen in his concept of ningen as aidagara (i.e., being within the sphere of
human relations), but by eliding the critical distance between an idealized image of the Japanese as
the embodiments of socio-cultural harmony and the people themselves, Watsuji’s description of
social relations, like the nohonshugi-ists’,  takes on the character of a moral imperative prescribing
social roles for each individual. What is clear is that Watsuji’s project of  overcoming the exclusion
of the collective experience of people from theory—the `dehumanization’ he found in modern
Western knowledge— in the end amounted to advocating the subjugation of the masses to his pre-
existing truth of a timeless and harmonious society devoid of political and historical processes and
practices. The elimination of the distance between ` what is theorized’ and ` what is’, and his neglect
of the existence of any mediating system of representation standing between knowledge and human
life, lies at the core of the problem in Japanese social sciences that continues to exert a powerful
influence over contemporary Japanese discursive space.
Equally contributing to the consolidation of the problematic discursive space of the 1930s was the
powerful philosophical work of Nishida Kitaro, the first Japanese `philosopher’, from whose
influence, it was said, no intellectual of that time was entirely free. Unlike Watsuji, Nishida’s work
is much more strictly governed by reason and an `objective’ method, with clear definitions of key
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concepts, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s. In the 1930s, however, Nishida’s work began to show
a similar romantic inclination, then wide-spread in the discursive space, and for that reason, it is said
that his philosophy at that time won far reaching popularity among non-academic readers despite
its complexity.
Under the strong influence of German idealism, Nishida launched an ambitious project of
formulating `Eastern philosophy’ by means of a Western `scientific’ method, and in doing so,
attempted to relativize the universality of Western ontology. In order to establish a Japanese-version
of philosophy, Nishida articulated a key concept, `pure experience’ (jyunsui keiken)—a Japanese way
of life based on Zen Buddhist ontology—into the realm of intelligibility. For him, pure experience
is a form of ` direct knowledge’ prior to subject-object, act-meaning, or being-value separation, and
therefore, that which could not be doubted.43  In his Zen no Kenkyu (Study of Good, 1911), Nishida
identified an unresolvable tension between the particularity of individuals and the generality of the
predicate (a concept analogous to Heidegger’s ‘Being’), which relation could never be explained by
logic, but only by the self-consciousness of the individual thrown into the system of  `objective’
constraints (roughly speaking socio-environmental factors).44  Nishida calls this predicate defining
all being, non-being, that which cannot be defined by anything other than itself, mu no basho (the place
of nothingness).  The challenge contained in the concept of mu no basho is in its ontological
questioning, which like in Heideggerian idealism, arose as a criticism of modern Western
philosophy’s dislocation of `others’ from their own `cultural’ space, band their displacement into
the realm of universal intelligibility. 
This logic of place is developed by Nishida in the 1930s into a concept of negative (being-less)
transcendental truth called `absolutely contradictory self-identity’ (zettai mujun-teki jikodoitsu). It is,
perhaps, the most influential and well circulated concept in his philosophy. In it the duality between
the subject and the object, the individual and the collective, and material and product, are united
in being itself. In so arguing, however, Nishida was aware of the irreducibility of the two opposed
terms, since this `unity’ is achieved through a discontinuous logical and ontological `jump’ which
is not lived only imagined.45 Nevertheless, Nishida’s concept of absolutely contradictory self-identity
was generally interpreted and elaborated as a state in which all historical and dialectical
contradictions are meta-theoretically transcended, wherein the distinction between being in history
and the order of `nature’ is abolished in a state of self-realization of mu (nothingness).46
Furthermore, since mu no basho was understood and taught in the academic discourse of the 1930s
as the quintessential embodiment of the Japanese cultural/religious way of life, it quickly became
equated with the essence of `Japan’, functioning as an, although undefinable, transcendental truth
towards which key terminologies and the network of meanings and evoked images in the discursive
space of the 1930s congregated. Being a signifying absence, this negative ` gathering point’ lent itself
to being replaced by other signifiers, and in fact this is what happened in the discursive space of the
1930s: the debates at that time centered on the question ‘What is the essence of Japan/What
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constitutes Japanese identity?’ attempted to construct a positive term out of Nishida’s negative
essence. In other words, Nishida’s philosophy became, both irrespective of his intentions and largely
by means of the unfaithful interpretations of his work by many of his contemporaries, the
ideological foundation on which a nativist and fascist `philosophy of Japan’ was established.
Nishida’s success in giving world authority to Japanese cultural/religious values, his creation of a
symbolic and philosophical concept powerful enough to signify the essence of ` Japan’, was to some
large extent hi-jacked by ideologues with more pragmatic agendas.47  Once this recontexualization
of Nishida’s philosophy was in place, the entire discursive space was rather easily transformed into
a singe intelligible sphere.
Constructing Japan’s `others’—Pan-Asianism 
One should not forget that the maturation process of the discourse of ` Japan’ was co-temporal with
the erasure of Others outside Japan, those whose `shadow’ images were internalized and
represented as idealized objects in a homogenized Japanese discursive space. This reduction of
Others into mere ` signs’ was completed by the beginning of the era of the ` recovery of literary art’,
an era which produced an enormous number of texts depicting `Asia’ (and `Korea’, `China’) and
the ` West’, as well as ` Japan’, in  idealized and objectified terms free from the historical and material
conditions of the time. For example, in  the early 1920’s Wago Tsuneo, a nohonshugi agrarian leader,
saw it as the “responsibility of the Japanese” to awaken a  “chosen spirit”, long asleep in the “sad
history” of Korea, in order to “provide chosen-jin (the Koreans) with a secure economic life”.48  Wago’s
Chosen spirit, however, is a romantic construction of Korean-ness equated with his religious and
aesthetic conception of the traditional beauty of  the people as living embodiment of Buddhism.
According to Wago’s logic, the liberation of the Koreans from their “sad history” meant not
throwing off the chains of Japanese imperialism but rather a re-establishment of the unfulfilled ideal
of the annexation of Korea, the realization of a `brotherhood’ between the two nations which, he
thought, was spoiled by the Japanese government’s `policy misconduct’.49  Wago’s nohonshugi
promoted Japanese emigration to Korea, where, he expected, the “equal co-existence” between the
two peoples of two great traditional spirits would be realized. Rather obviously, Wago’s sympathy
for Korean peasants and his ideal conception of `Japan’s task’ of assisting both Korean socio-
economic development and their ` spiritual recovery’ were betrayed most clearly as forms of Korean
resistance, more or less consistent after the Russo-Japanese war, to Japanese rule. Wago’s abstract
and aesthetic idealization of the Korean peasantry was so removed from the historical experience
of the Koreans that even his short visit to the Korean countryside in 1927 could not shatter his solid
image of the chosen spirit and Japan’s mission of assistance.50 
While Wago’s idealization of the Koreans appears today naive and somewhat `innocent’, his
depoliticized conception of political issues (i.e., emigration, and economic development assistance)
formulated in exclusively cultural and religious terms, contributed to the elimination of the political
in Japanese prewar discourse, and was itself thus a powerful form of ideology. This romantic, anti-
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historical, and idealistic construction of brotherhood with the Koreans was one of the principal
legitimating strategies in Japan’s 1910 annexation of the country, the establishment of Manchu-kuo,
and became later a  foundational plank in the militarist ideology of the `Greater-Asian co-
prosperity’. Chosen spirit, fraternal love and the notion of assistance were amalgamated under the
theory of doso-ron.  In doso-ron (theory of the same ancestry), difference between the Japanese and the
Koreans was denied; the latter were seen as a sub-group of the former. Like Wago, this theory
advocated Japan’s `love’ and `duty’ as `brother’ to support Korean economic development, while
the actual procedure was much dependent on Japan’s military power. This affectionate formulation
was perhaps a tactic disguising both the necessity of military force and the Japanese fear of Koreans
who needed to be subjugated to  the paternal authority of the Japanese emperor. The hypocrisy of
this theory was in its turning a blind eye to the use of brute force; its anti-factual formulation itself
was sanctioned by the increasingly enclosed, narcissistic, and ` humanized’ discursive space that had
progressively structured Japanese intellectual debate since the Taisho era. Once the Koreans were
represented as idealized `other’ in Japanese discursive space, objectified, voiceless `signs’ without
a subject position, violence against them by crude military force could be interpreted and explained
the dominant ideologies (i.e., doso-ron and `Asian co-prosperity’) themselves authorized by a mode
of the discourse devoid of the material, the political and the historical.
That the discourse of ` Japan’ could not be established without generating ` others’, those necessarily
excluded in the construction of an enclosed Japan-centered realm of intelligibility, is perhaps most
clearly seen in a series of Watsuji’s works devoted to the typology of `national characteristics’.
Watsuji applied his concept of fudo in his comparative socio-cultural analysis to the relation between
the geo-climatological features of different parts of the world and the characteristics of the peoples
resident there. The vastness of the Chinese sub-continent was described as static, empty, and
monotonous; these climatic aspects, he argued, necessarily make the Chinese a people “[lacking in]
emotion”, whose “passive and persistent personality [is] manifest in their persistent will power and
harshness of emotions”, and that it was their “perseverance to tradition and strong sense of history”
that allow them to “bear the static emptiness” of their geography.51  In his 1929 work (“Shina-jin no
tokusei”; “Particularities of the Chinese”)  comparing the ` national character’ of the Japanese and the
Chinese, Watsuji maintains that, 
When we compare the lack of feeling of the Chinese, we become painfully aware [of]
how emotional sensitivity is a vital characteristic of the Japanese. This means that the
Japanese are weaker in will to survival than the Chinese; however, it simultaneously
means that the latter are much more humane in their emotions.52 
The Japanese, argues Watsuji, thus must maintain national unity tin order to counter-act Chinese
power, because a Japanese individual cannot win in competition with a Chinese and  that if “the
Chinese win over the Japanese, then, that would be a regression for humanity.” 53 Despite his detailed
elaboration of Chinese characteristics, Watsuji’s discourse of national characteristics says more
about his own fear of the Chinese people, than about the Chinese themselves. 
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This crude typology is also exercised in his characterization of the ` West’ in an earlier work.  In his
“Genshi kiristo-kyo no bunkashi-teki igi” (“The cultural historical significance of primitive Christianity”) of
1921, Watsuji compares the Romans with the Anglo-Saxons and finds that they are  “extremely alike
in terms of their bruteness, of their practical, pragmatic orientations.” 54  His monotonous
denunciation of the ` barbaric’ character of Romans and Anglo-Saxons, contrasted with what he sees
as Asian `spiritual’ culture, is extended to modern civilization and all modernized nations in a kind
of eschatological curse against the modern age: “Prussian civilization... is equally barbaric. So is
modern Japanese civilization, in its contemptuous mimickery of the Anglo-Saxons. However, the
epitome of this characteristic is exemplified by the North American barbarians, Yankees.”; “Romans
were the barbarians who ended the age of culture. Are Anglo-Saxons not barbarians who arose to
tell the end of modern culture?”55   These statements are unworthy of serious  analysis; however they
are cited in order to demonstrate how Watsuji’s characterizations of all non-Japanese peoples are
formulated as negatives of what he conceives of as `true Japanese characteristics’—the standard
against which all peoples are compared. Although these works on national typologies were
published in the 1920s, the underlying thesis of his major works of the mid-1930s, while formulated
with greater sophistication, can be found in his earlier assumption of the superiority of Japanese
culture. Watsuji’s earlier texts speak loud and clear of his unstated ideological agenda to confirm and
spread a belief in Japanese cultural superiority, and directly contributed towards the subsequent
annihilation of the Others and the homogenization of Japanese discursive space. Once silent
`others’ are constructed as viable categories—i.e., as shadow images—in the discourse of `Japan’,
statements about them can only function to reinforce self-affirmations of Japanese superiority.
Pan-Asianism can be seen as a product of the artificial creation of sameness in a singular discursive
space in which `Asia’ and the `West’ were reduced into mere signs to affirm the centrality of the
master sign—`Japan’. One of the most powerful components of Pan-Asianism, together with doso-
ron, was theory of civilization that first appeared in 1906 and became popular in the Taisho era
(1912-25). Okuma Shigenebu argues that Eastern and Western civilizations developed along
different paths and “met by accident in Japan.”56 Okuma’s conception that Eastern and Western
civilizations harmoniously co-existed in Japan, however, was later revised in 1919 by the notion that
Eastern and Western civilizations were fundamentally incompatible and bound to confront to each
other. This radical shift of emphasis may have been a reflection of the heightening tensions between
the U.S. and Japan during this period over the issue of emigration. Be that as it may, what is certain
is that Okuma’s about face represented the completion of the movement of internalizing the West
as Other, in which the West was internalized as a ‘shadow image’, a stereotypified ‘other’. As
Japanese relations with the US deteriorated in the 1930s, and the boundaries between categories and
theories were increasingly drawn in an arbitrarily fashion reflecting the desires of the producers of
knowledge, ` Asia’ was both idealized (as embodiment of cultural beauty relative to the ` West’) and
viewed contemptuously (as economically backward vis-à-vis the Japanese).  Harmonious and
confrontational relations between civilizations were separately applied to `Asia’ and the `West’
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respectively, whereas Japan’s unique position as synthesis of the two civilizations remained in both.
Curiously, this internationalism/universalism served as the basis of Pan-Asianism, which attempted
to negate the differences within the homogenized category ` Asia’, and unite a common front against
Western geo-political aspirations in Asia. Pan-Asianism, in this sense, was not a form of nationalism;
rather, it should be understood as the external expression of the maturation process of the discourse
of ` Japan’, complementary twin of the narcissistic enclosure of discursive space in which the identity
of `Japan’ was sought.
Following on the heels of this process of the elimination of both internal and external Others was
the rise of an indulgent discursive monologue enclosed in an homogenized discursive space of an
exclusivist community. Karatani has characterized this monologue as “a self-indulgent attitude
towards ambiguity, an abandonment of the task of distinguishing difference from sameness” (p139),
and a “play with the images of signs” that obscured the temporal and spatial differences of various
texts, resulting in a widespread illusion of `sameness’ (i.e., communal unity). 57  Out of this illusion
of `sameness’ rose Taisho universalism in which a false democracy and cosmopolitan
internationalism established themselves as the dominant trends for conceiving domestic social
relations and external relations.58  This Taisho idealistic internationalism, Karatani argues, must be
distinguished from the internationalism typical of the pervious era:
[Meiji scholars like Natsume Soseki] attempted to `scientifically’ objectify the
universal ground of difference between Western and Eastern literature on a material
and historical level...In the Taisho era, this was completely reversed, that is, the
difference between the West and Japan began to be emphasized, from the
perspective of sameness, in which the ` West’ became a mere sign, and so did ` Toyo’
[Asia].59 
While the discourse of `things that are Japanese’ in the Taisho era was merely a mode of self-
signification in the context of a greater pro-modernizationism, it was in the mid-1930s, the era of
the ` recovery of literary art’, when this discursive state was fused with greater intellectual and social
concerns. The fundamental question of Japan and the West was addressed by Watsuji and Nishida
in the increasingly tense environment of the coming of war, and in this `tightening’ of the socio-
political conditions, the cosmopolitan internationalist posture of the Taisho era was replaced by an
exclusionary cultural particularism.
Conclusion
The consequence of the `literalization of philosophy’, and the `humanization of scientific
knowledge’ in the mid-1930s was the emergence of an increasingly narcissistic, ` enclosed’ discursive
space seemingly devoid of an objective/material/historical vision of the world, and the
transposition of what was once external to the discourse into its sphere of intelligibility—what I
have called the disappearance of the Other. At the same time, this maturity of the `pure surface’
fostered an increased desire for ` lost subjectivity’, the desire to formulate what defines ` Japan’. The
emergence of `Japan’ as an ethically motivated `transcendental signified’, in which the boundary
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between reason and experience was bluntly erased in favour for the latter, marked a turning point
where personal religious/aesthetic feelings were championed at the expense of social and political
justice—a triumph of emotion over reason. The advancement of this discursive trend had direct
social implications, including the collapse of both urban industrial and rural agrarian social struggles,
and the political and military campaigns against Asia. The construction of Asian `others’ in terms
of dogmatic nationalist ideology was a complementary-twin of the emergence and authorization of
what constituted ` Japan’, imposing on Asians a Japanese definition of them as ` others’. At this stage,
Japanese discursive space was freed from the historical and the material; there would be henceforth
nothing external to a discursive space which absorbed all under its sphere. 
The completion of this narcissistic discursive enclosure in the 1930s aided and abetted the march
towards kokutai—the principle building block of Japanese fascism centered on the cult of the
emperor. The triumph of Japanese fascism based on a right-wing ` philosophy of action’, corporatist
politics, and the mythology of the emperor was only a step away from this discursive condition,
ruled by the necessity of reconstructing a lost identity: a deeply troubled cognitive orientation
lacking a structure for maintaining distance between what belongs to discourse and what is its
object. Prewar discourse’s endless indulgence in solipsistic debates produced the ideological finale
of Fundamentals of Our National Polity, or kokutai no hongi, and beyond.
III.   Beyond the `Otherwise-Other’—A Discussion
In the above analysis, I attempted to show some specific tactics employed in influential Japanese
prewar intellectual artefacts, which seemed to satisfy pressing social `needs’ of the time for the
eliminating the Other—the alien aspects of modern/Western philosophy. I focused on three
streams of knowledge produced: 1] folk ethnology and nohonshugi, 2] Watsuji’s `humanized social
science’, and 3] the description of external Others (largely Asians). Despite their different audiences,
tactics employed, and targets of elimination, these three streams of knowledge can be seen as
structurally complementary, and mutually reinforcing, endowed with a distinct task to give rise to
the discursive space centered on `Japan’. In order to show the relation among them, I provide a
brief summary of the above discussion for this purpose.
Ethnologists like Yanagida and nohonshugi advocates formulated a sense of cultural identity common
to all Japanese strongly associated with past `tradition’. This identity is characterized by strongly
mythological/cosmological images of the unity with nature, and was felt to be increasingly
jeopardized by the influence of the modern West. This imagery of ` otherwise-Other’ was powerfully
present in war ideologies like kokutai no hongi, as an aesthetic, spiritual essence of `Japan’. Folk
knowledge also served as an ideological instrument for transforming the countryside into the
`spiritual homeland’ of all Japanese. By virtue of this modern Japanese knowledge in which the
boundary between the past and the present, nature and culture, and deity and human were
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collapsed, rural folk became subject to the goal of constructing an idealized image of traditional
Japanese society. Indeed, this powerful aesthetic and moral imperative to recover lost tradition
counteracted and transcended the growing consciousness of modern subjectivity and history and
nullified their effects. Agrarian tenant movements which had introduced internal conflicts and
differences into rural communities, soon transformed into movements of nohonshugi. Therefore, we
may say that the influence of the modern West as Other in the countryside was `overcome’ in the
process of the maturation of folk ethnology and nohonshugi, and the construction of an `otherwise-
Other’ was underway, preparing society for kokutai. 
In the urban sector where the concept of cultural unity was in an advanced state of erosion, the role
of romantic knowledge was less dramatic than in the countryside. However, the maturity of the
process of eliminating the Other in the discursive space was powerful enough to motivate the urban
population to realize the true, authentic `Japan’. In this context, Watsuji’s concept of ethics as
everyday cultural practice and the elision of the boundary between knowledge and its objects
effectively authorized both cultural pride and a strong moral imperative among urban populations.
Beyond that, Watsuji’s work made at least two more important contributions to the nullification of
the Other. The first was his redefinition of the notions of human existence as collective and space
as the corporeality of the socio-cultural life of the peoples, in such a way as to preempt modern
subjectivity. The second contribution came from his methodology; his hermeneutic elaboration of
meanings effectively obscured the material, historical, political and the structural, and thereby
accelerated an indulgence in a `play of language’ internalizing and defining what ought to have
remained outside the boundary of knowledge. Japanese discursive space in the 1930s was a full-
fledged realization of what Deleuze described as “the discovery of the surface, of the elemental
beyond, of the `otherwise-Other’”, in which meanings were arbitrarily associated with signs—i.e.,
`Japan’, ` human’ and ` ethics’, in flagrant disregard of their historical counterparts. In this discursive
context, Nishida’s effort to formulate a Japanese version of philosophy provided a negative
`gathering point’ for meaning in this completely decentered discursive space, a vacant conceptual
center which could be reorganized and restructured under the signs of  `Japan’, `kokutai’, and the
`emperor’. 
This process of constructing the ideal images of Japanese cultural essence involved the necessary
internalization and reduction of the concrete/historical Others of Japan—Korea, China, and the
U.S.—transforming them into intelligible ` others’ under a Japan-centered perspective in which the
Japanese took up the position of the `self’. The structural complementality between this
`conversion’ of external Others and the rise of `Japan’ as the `gathering point’ for all meaning is
crucial; in fact, they are two sides of a single coin, the inside and the outside of the boundary drawn
by the hegemonic perspective. Asianism, in particular, played a key role in this process, for it
provided the discursive ground on which the construction of  `Japan’ was made possible, by
selectively identifying and differentiating `Asia’  from `Japan’, and the `West’ from `Asia’, leaving
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Japan in the strategic center. This usage of Asianism as a buffer can most clearly be seen in the
double-standard imposed upon Asia, that is, `Asia’ was both idealized and subject to contempt
according to whether Japan wished to identify with or differentiate itself from the characteristics
in question.  Wago’s depiction of `Koreans’ as `brothers’ with great spiritual potential, and as
`victims’ of the `sad history’ of the past exemplifies this point. Once again,  the material, political
and historical are missing from this knowledge, and images of Others are constructed unconstrained
by their objective/ historical conditions in order to confirm the superiority of the Japanese. In other
words, the transformation in the discursive space of the 1930s of external Others into ` others’ less
than the Japanese, was the axiom enabling the rise of a Japanese hegemonic perspective, the
negative-twin of the construction of the `otherwise-Other’ in which `others’ served as the mirror
defining the Japanese `self’.
What motivated prewar Japanese intellectuals and society as a whole to incline to the discourse of
`Japan’ with its `sloppy’ logic and strongly romantic sentiments; what was the source of this extra-
rational force driving prewar Japanese discursive space in the way it did?  Some situate this romantic
driving force in the orientation of the society as a whole—i.e., in the `cultural characteristics’ of
Japan and/or the `psychological inclination’ of the Japanese.  I reject this line of argument, as
exemplified in ideas of the ` political culturalists’, which assume essential characteristics in ` Japanese
culture’ or a `psychological inclination’ common to all Japanese. Should it then be sought in the
inclination of figures like Watsuji and Yanagida, or in the power of the newly formed modern
nation-state to manipulate the production of knowledge to suit its own interests of manufacturing
and controlling a discourse of national power?  The first answer  places the responsibility on those
Japanese intellectuals, who over-reacted against modern/Western perspectives and ideas, and
thereby, intended or not, misinformed and `misguided’ society as a whole. The second answer, on
the other hand, is suggestive of the potent role the state could play in producing, transmitting, and
circulating knowledge favorable to its leaders’ aspirations, and the critical role of knowledge in the
reorganization of society. 
Although it is not my intention to underestimate responsibility on the producers of knowledge nor
on the system of disseminating knowledge in the critical stage of nation-state formation, there is an
undeniable instrumentalist bent to these conceptions of knowledge in that they assume a too
straight-forward cause-effect relation between knowledge and historical outcomes. By giving too
much credence to the producers and operational mechanism of knowledge, this argument obscures
the question of what conditioned the very cognitive schema of the producers of knowledge. My
argument is to emphasize the role and functioning of the entire discursive space as a humanly
constructed mediating system, only through which the world reveal itself; for individuals cannot step
outside the particular historical and cultural discursive context in which they live. I would argue that
the problematic development of prewar Japanese discursive space was driven neither by ideological
innovation of particular intellectuals nor the state power apparatus in its deepest sense, but was
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rather a manifestation of a deeper driving force originating external to the realm of discourse,
namely, the quest for identity. I argue that this quest gradually distorted  prewar discursive
space—constructing what Deleuze has called the `otherwise-Other’—and it was through the
mediation of this distortion that the ` lost’ identity and totality of the world was restored. This point
intersects with another important question of what determines the degree of `objectivity’ in
discursive space, ` objectivity’ in terms of the relative ` accuracy’ of representing historical world. The
Deleuzian concept of the Other allows us to conceive `objectivity’ as a capacity of `openness’ and
`fairness’ towards the Other, or the state of discourse capable of tolerating and accepting differences
as beyond its sphere of intelligibility.
What was then the ` guiding logic’ and the mechanism for replacing the Other with the `otherwise-
Other’ in Japanese discursive space of the 1930s? Karatani Kojin has called this system of
nullification of what is alien and external, and its transformation into what is ` comprehensible’ and
`Japanese’ as jinen. Jinen is also a concept which might characterize the Shintoist/ animistic
cosmological view of the world which refutes transcendental truth, by accepting the world as it is,
in understanding that a system describing the necessity of the way things are is one fundamentally
beyond the will of the subject. 60  In Japanese, the Chinese characters signifying the concept of jinen
are also identical to the characters for Nature (shizen), and combine this with two concepts of
Western philosophy: the essence of a thing, or its transcendental `true’ being, and the negative function
which makes being as being without the subject’s interference. 61  This dual-meaning of the concept
gives us an image of the power concealed in the term and its ability to induce acceptance of
historically/socially determined relations as ` natural’ ways of being beyond any humanly constructed
world.
How was jinen manifest in the development of prewar Japanese discursive space? As most explicitly
exemplified in Watsuji’s redefinition of Western conceptions of spatiality (fudo) and man, the
elimination of the modern as Other was brought about by the `humanization’ of the original
(Western) concepts, by incorporating what Watsuji believed were the `humane’, `indivisible’ and
`affectionate’ aspects of humanity to a crude ` scientific’, ` atomistic’ and ` materialistic’ conception.
In doing so, `alien’ modern concepts were `nativized’ and rendered non-threatening. This
`nativization’ of aspects of the modern—the functioning of jinen—actively internalized what used
to be external and beyond the understanding of Japanese discursive space—i.e., the figurative and
concrete Other. In this process, what was in an asymmetrical relation to Japanese discursive space
was made symmetrical by the conceptual structure and the available categories. The transformation
of the conception of `human’ from the modern subject to Watsuji’s `subject-less subject’
exemplified this reduction.  The same process generated a self-conscious identity, a self defined in
opposition to an ` other’, a reduced internalized version of the alien Other. In Karatani’s conception,
jinen can also be understood as a process of ` self-differentiation’, in which the subject is made aware
of itself only in the process of distinguishing itself from ` what it is not’. 62  The modern conception
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of man as an autonomous self-regulating individual was transformed to a concept of man as both
individual and constituent of the socio-cultural whole; and this double role was then understood to
be the exclusive cultural virtue of the Japanese. The reduction of the external Other into an
intelligible `other’, or its `nativization’ by the jinen mechanism, was not, however, an adaptation of
the Other but rather a rejection of it, since the presence of what constitutes the cognitive boundary
for the Japanese, and its existence as limitation, was denied by this act of inclusion. In other words,
the rise and the maturing of jinen was an absorption of what should have remained outside the
discursive boundary, the Deleuzian Other that structures cognition and makes possible a ` possible
world’. Jinen in this sense is opposed to the concept of the Other, in that it creates a narcissistically
enclosed discursive space in which the subject indulges in an endless monologue in a language
describing nothing but himself (the `double’).
We can therefore begin to see how the mechanism of jinen could produce a discursive space devoid
of the Other in the 1930s. However, the deeper cause of this phenomenon, that is, the persistent
attempt, consciously or sub-consciously, to erect an ` otherwise-Other’ cannot be explained without
investigating the way in which Japan encountered the West as Other. And this in turn is linked to
the problem of the identity of the `other’, an ontological difficulty experienced by the peoples of
the non-West excluded from hegemonic representation and whose differences vis-à-vis the West
were reduced into a form of lesser Western identity. Thus we have the situation in which, on the
one hand,  jinen (or the `deconstruction’ of the modern) is little more than a narcissistic nativist,
reactionary force threatening the universality of the contemporary world. Yet, on the other hand,
the jinen phenomenon was a reactionary response to the universalizing hegemonic forces which
threatened Japanese culture, already fallen under their potent influences, with erasure. Modern
hegemonic representation exploits culture in a contradictory way: the differences between cultures
provide the basis on which the collective polity of the nation-state operates, on the one hand, while
the same differences are negated by the principle of universality, on the other.  Japanese cultural
identity then can be seen as  caught up with an ambivalence arising from the process establishing
the modern hegemonic world, whose authorizing discourse is dependent upon a plurality of cultures
and yet denies their particularity in incorporating them into the world of universal intelligibility. The
Japanese social scientist Sakai Naoki has argued that
Japan is defined as a specific and unitary particularity in universal terms: Japan’s
uniqueness and identity are provided insofar as Japan stands out as a particular
object in the universal field of the West. Only when it is integrated into Western
universalism does it gain its own identity as a particularity. In other worlds, Japan
becomes endowed with and aware of its `self’ only when it is recognized by the
West... [The Japanese cultural particularists’] insistence on Japan’s peculiarity and
difference from the West embodies a nagging urge to see the self from the viewpoint
of the Other. But this is nothing but the positing of Japan’s identity in Western
terms which in turn establishes the centrality of the West as the universal point of
reference.63
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As Edward Said and others have argued, the establishment of the modern universal world was but
an expansion of a European hegemonic perspective vis-à-vis the non-West, largely through the
agency of the twin modern institutional forces of international capital and the universal state system.
As universal perspective came into being, the plurality of cultures and peoples whose spatial
differences were asymmetrical to the European notion challenged the very idea of a `universal
world’ and  a single mankind.  These Others threatened the very universality of the European
perspective, and hence sought to neutralize that threat by converting those differences into
something intelligible to Europeans, preferably, what Europe had already temporalily overcome.
The non-West, initial an externality to European discourse, was converted into a shadow image of
Europe’s past, that is, into one of stages of development in the succession of time from `tradition’
to `modern’.64  This representational violence against the preexisting spatial diversity of different
cultures and peoples was the pre-condition for the emergence of modern hegemony centering on
the West. Accordingly, the world only became intelligible as a unified geo-political time and space
by falling under the hegemonic gaze of the West operating under a single set of ` rules of the game’,
governed by the laws of the international market and `autonomous’ sovereign nation-states.
Differently put, the exclusion of non-Western others has served as the constitutive ` outside’ of this
hegemonic representation, that without which the world could not emerge as the one we know it
today. The result was annihilation of the cultures and peoples of the non-West, whose identity was
reduced to that of being both the opposite of and less than the Western `self’. The hierarchy of
identity within the modern world rests on this definition of Western self and non-Western other,
in which all actors are obliged to endlessly strive in History in order to overcome ones’ own
incompleteness (i.e., `barbarism’ and `underdevelopment’).
This was the context in which Japan departed from its ` pre-modern’ history and voluntary isolation
from the rest of the world and entered `modern history’. The English victory over China in the
Opium wars (1842) was viewed as the fall of anti-Western bulwark, and perceived by the Japanese
as opening Japan to a total exposure to the imperial powers that threatened to devour the country.65
The Meiji Restoration (1868) can be seen then as the internal political reaction to that extraordinary
external state of affairs, a ` solution’ chosen by nationalist leaders of the country in order to achieve
the economic and military muscle necessary to maintaining the political and cultural autonomy of
the nation. In hindsight, it is clear that material modernization without adapting modern ideas was
a wishful thinking, given that participation in international polity and economy meant subordination
to the `rules of the game’ of international institutions—international capitalism and the universal
nation-state representative system. Rapid socio-economic changes brought on by the process of
modernization was accompanied by a breakdown of the historically deep seated cultural value
principles that had sustained both the traditional family system and hierarchical but complementary
village social relations. This transition was experienced by many as trauma, was often perceived as
a disintegration of the society as a whole and the loss of cultural identity. The introduction of
modern conceptions of the human, nature and history was most often experienced as an increasing
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objectification and alienation of one’s own body from consciousness and nature, formerly felt to
be in unity with the self, and now only appearing as `landscape’. It was not accidental that Watsuji
was preoccupied with a redefinition of man (ningen) and nature (fudo). This emergence of a conceptual
hegemony, increasingly defined as alien, in the same movement nourished a yearning for the
certainties of the past and a quest in reclamation of lost cultural identity that reconstructed a lost
`tradition’ in the present. The most explicit embodiments of this longing were folk ethnology and
nohonshugi which presented an alternate vision of the world based on agrarian communal life .
Once the national priority of securing political autonomy was more or less achieved after the Russo-
Japanese war, the encounter with the West as the Other entered a second, more introspective phase.
A prevalent socio-cultural ` mood’ of yearning for the perceived previous state of ` innocence’,  free
from all anxiety, pain, and doubt about one’s own identity took hold of society. It is noteworthy that
in Japan’s case  memories of a painful encounter with the Other were provoked only after the
achievement of the proclaimed national goal (material wealth). The question of the extent to which
material wealth allowed the Japanese to repudiate `excessive’ internationalism and to call their
crippled `cultural autonomy’ and national identity into question is an interesting one. Be that as it
may an `atmosphere’ of yearning for the past was romantically expressed a movement to pitting
`spirituality’ and `humanity’ against `scientific objectivity’ and modern epistemology. The sense of
lost happiness was in this phase commonly understood as resulting from brute intrusion of the
modern West which had destroyed the virtue of Japanese cultural tradition; regaining the lost
tradition was seen as the only possible bulwark against the further alienation, pain and cultural
annihilation. The more the presence of the gaze of the modern West was felt, so works this
psychology, the stronger was the need for national/cultural identity. This motivation, however, was
also a denial of the presence of the Other in Japanese discursive space—the Other both as the a
priori structure of cognition introduced by the modern West and as an actual representative of it
(i.e., the Western power). 
The process of the elimination of the Other, a movement that quickly slid into an operationalization
of  jinen, was therefore an expression of a desire for cultural identity driven by an acute sense of its
lack, an ethical impulse to recover the broken linkage between the self and the world. In the
discursive space in which the distance between perception and its object was elided, the subject was
preoccupied with `regaining the lost identity of consciousness and experience’. In this case, the
`recovery of identity’ becomes a necessity, without which, it is perceived, the world (in the absence
of the Other) can no longer be sustained. This ethical and emotional motivation which underlay
prewar Japanese discursive development ultimately coalesced into `Japan’, the `transcendental
signified’ into which all meanings were articulated and integrated in order to fill the profoundly felt
`lack’. Jinen created the `world-otherwise’ in prewar Japanese discursive space, a conceptual world
that had only existed in the past, and denied the actuality of its pastness; that is, jinen engineered an
idealized past world in the present. It was a “reactionary response of the senses and aesthetic
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experiences, which had been alienated by stoic, foreign, and moralistic Marxist visions of society
that were perceived as alien”.66
What is ironic in this `revolt’ against the modern West as Other is that the desire to refute the
modern is itself is a product of the modern; the scope and contents of Japan’s desire were
formulated in the very categories of the modern, desiring “an object only as expressed by the Other
in the mode of possible”. 67   Watsuji’s desire to redefine the concepts of space as human habitat
(fudo) and that of `mankind’ as socio-cultural collective (ningen) was only possible by virtue of his
experiencing space and humanity in the modern/Western way. The same is true of Nishida’s and
Yanagida’s attempts to construct Buddhist inspired Japanese versions of philosophy and ethnology,
the contents of which first came to be illuminated by modern/Western epistemology.  The irony
here is that both this very desire to refute the Other and the means of replacing it were dependent
on and configured by the Other; and therefore, the construction of an `otherwise-Other’, despite
the seemingly wholesale rejection of the properties of the modern that Japanese intellectuals
champions served in the end to both reinforce the centrality of the modern/Western
epistemological perspective, that without which such desires were unimaginable. 
The above argument based on Japanese is experience also applicable to the difficulties experienced
by many non-Western societies, those whose collective identity was annihilated in Euro-centric
hegemonic representation. In order to operate effectively within the international hegemonic
system, the non-West must not simply `catch-up’ to Western levels of material wealth, but more
significantly they must somehow ` manage’ their ontological dislocation from the homeland of their
perceived ` lost identity’. Since their encounter with the Other induces self-differentiation on the part
of native cultures, they are stuck with the task of reconciling what they are `represented’ to be in
the hegemonic system and that which they feel they were. In addition, there is the problem of what
they see mirrored in their perception of the Other. The extent to which they perceive a threat in that
mirror, and in the awesome technological, economic, conceptual, and political power of the West,
will often, and perhaps justifiably, lead to an anti-modern and anti-materialist reaction, as it did in
the Japanese case, counter-acting any state projects of material modernization. To complicate the
matter, however, a sense of national identity is an indispensable necessity in justifying and
rationalizing the state’s authority and ability to steer the nation, and motivate the population towards
its goals. The fact is that there is no modern nation-state, or any other form of collective polity for
that matter, without collective identity—that which successfully draws the boundaries between
inside and outside, and self and other, in order to establish the delicate balance between the
universal international system and the politico-cultural autonomy of the sovereign state—which lies
at the structural core of the modern world. The dilemma of the non-West is to establish a functional
system of mediation (both institutional and symbolic) that can constantly affirm its unity and
domestic hegemony, while simultaneously being structurally dependent on the rationalist
international political economic institutions safeguarded by the hegemonic discourse that denies the
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cultures of the non-West. This is why nativist counter-hegemonic resistance almost always takes the
aesthetic expression of nationalist identity claims and religious fundamentalism, and is inherently
threatening to the international hegemonic system. The fundamental cause of this challenge lies in
the problem of non-Western identity, the hegemonic representation of which is a ` fraud’, if it is not
excluded all together from the hegemonic system, and therefore, non-Western identity often seeks
itself ` outside’ Euro-centric hegemonic discourse—an impossible dream—and in doing so destroys
the possibility of the world, the Other, all together.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to draw out some of the lessons this study of prewar Japanese
experience could provide for the world at large and Canadian society in particular. Due to the very
nature of identity, its being both indispensable for human survival and its necessary generation of
`others’, the question of identity implies something unresolvable in relations between individuals
and nations. This does not mean that individuals and nations are in a constant state of conflict, as
some realists in the field of international relations have argued; rather, as experience indicates,
communication and negotiation have been effective tools for fostering co-existence among different
peoples and nations. However, there are certain conditions when these instruments do not appear
to be an option, particularly when the Other disappears from discursive and cognitive space. The
point I want to repeat here is that the slide from the state of cognition in the presence of the Other
to that in the absence of the Other in Japanese discursive space was extra-discursively and extra-
rationally motivated and induced by Japanese exclusion from hegemonic representation. That is to
say, there is a danger inherent in the international hegemonic system of generating challenges from
`others’. These challenges potentially arise in so far as the hegemonic power of the contemporary
international system is at work, that is in so far as the sense of misery such as economic inequality
and the multitudes of `disastrous misfortunes’ constantly visiting the developing societies are felt.
What I am insisting on is that problems seemingly confined within national boundaries are indeed
international, and must be the concern of all participants of the international, and each social,
hegemony. Those whose identity have been deprived must remember that it is not possible to
formulate identity as such in their own terms, because of the very structure the human world is
mediated by language, and any attempt to construct an alternative identity would inevitably be self-
destructive, in creating its own `others’, and would paradoxically merely confirm the authority of
the hegemonic perspective. On the other hand, the lesson to be drawn from past Japanese
experience is not a reinforcement of the hegemonic view for all, but a sense of tolerance and
accommodation for `others’; and that demands strength and confidence to live a less certain and
more flexible identity on the part of the `self’. The solution to the problem of both non-Western
and Western identity, conceived in the broadest sense, lies in the capacity of each individual and
nation to reject any and every narcissistic enclosure of discourse that operationalizes ` us’ vs. ` them’
in the name of securing identity. Indeed it appears that the world at large is rapidly falling into the
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state of cognition described as that in the absence of the Other; in both international and domestic
societies—i.e., the rise of a renewed racism, nationalist fundamentalist movements, and religious
mystical cults. To struggle against narcissism and the enclosed ` logic of community’ is the only way
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